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Abstract
As AI is increasingly being adopted into applica-
tion solutions, the challenge of supporting inter-
action with humans is becoming more apparent.
Partly this is to support integrated working styles,
in which humans and intelligent systems cooper-
ate in problem-solving, but also it is a necessary
step in the process of building trust as humans mi-
grate greater responsibility to such systems. The
challenge is to find effective ways to communicate
the foundations of AI-driven behaviour, when the
algorithms that drive it are far from transparent to
humans. In this paper we consider the opportuni-
ties that arise in AI planning, exploiting the model-
based representations that form a familiar and com-
mon basis for communication with users, while ac-
knowledging the gap between planning algorithms
and human problem-solving.
1 Introduction
DARPA recently launched the Explainable AI (XAI) pro-
gram1 that aims to create a suite of AI systems able to ex-
plain their own behaviour. This program is mainly concerned
with machine/deep learning techniques, as they are currently
treated almost as a black box. For example, it is not possible
to fully understand why alphaGo selected a specific move at
each turn, or on what basis a neural network recognises an
image as an “image of a cat”.
The need for explainable AI is motivated mainly by three
reasons:
• the need for trust;
• the need for interaction;
• the need for transparency.
If doctors want to use a neural network to make a diagno-
sis, they need to be confident that there is a clear rationale for
the NN to diagnose a cancer, in order to build trust. As auton-
omy gathers traction, in many scenarios, instead of full auton-
omy, Human-Autonomy Teaming (HAT) is required, where
humans interact with the AI systems, and for this humans
1http://www.darpa.mil/attachments/DARPA-BAA-16-53.pdf
need to understand why the AI system is suggesting some-
thing that the human would not do: this requires interaction.
There are growing legal implications in the use of AI, and
in the cases where the AI system makes the wrong decision,
or simply disagrees with the human, it is important to under-
stand why a wrong or different decision was made: this is
transparency.
Explainable AI is harder to achieve than the good decision-
making that underlies it. The need to explain decisions forces
them to be made in ways that can be subsequently justi-
fied in human terms. Entirely trustworthy and theoretically
well-understood algorithms can still yield decisions that are
hard to explain. For example, linear programming is a well-
established tool, but explaining the results it generates with-
out simply ‘appealing to authority’ remains hard. Part of the
difficulty lies in understanding what an explanation should
actually contain.
On one hand it is evident that there has been amazing
progress in machine/deep learning research and there is a
huge proliferation of ML and DL learning. On the other hand,
Deep Neural Networks are still far away from being explain-
able.
In contrast, AI Planning is potentially well placed to be
able to address the challenges that motived the DARPA
project on AI: planners can eventually be trusted; planners
can allow an easy interaction with humans; planners are trans-
parent (at least, the process by which the decisions are made
are understood by their programmers).
This paper presents Explainable Planning (XAIP), describ-
ing some initial results, and proposing a roadmap for making
XAIP more effective and efficient.
Of course the challenge of Explainable AI and the need of
making machine/deep learning explicable remain of critical
importance. At the same time, we think that XAIP is an im-
portant contribution in this direction, as Planning is an impor-
tant area of AI with applications in domains where learning
is not an option.
The paper is structured as follows. We give an overview of
related work in the next section. In Section 3 we list some
important questions that XAIP should address and in Section
4 we discuss the features of planning that facilitate explana-
tions. In Section 5 we present initial results and suggest future
directions. In Section 6 we show two illustrative examples.
Section 7 concludes the paper.
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2 Related Work
For a survey of recent works in the broader area of Explain-
able AI, we refer to the IJCAI-17 XAI workshop website2.
Here we briefly highlight some recent works that are related
and can contribute to Explainable Planning. Plan Explana-
tion is an area of Planning where the main goal is to help
humans to understand the plans produced by the planners
(e.g., [Sohrabi et al., 2011]. This involves the translation of
the planner outputs (e.g., PDDL plans) in forms that humans
can easily understand; the design of interfaces that help this
understanding (e.g., spoken language dialog systems [Bidot
et al., 2010]); and the description of causal and temporal rela-
tions for plan steps (e.g., [Seegebarth et al., 2012]). Note that
making sense of a plan (plan explanation) is different from
explaining why a planner made decisions (XAIP).
Plan Explicability [Zhang et al., 2017] focuses on human’s
interpretation of plans. Learning is used to create a model of
the interpretations, which is then used to measure the expli-
cability and predictability of plans.
Veloso and her team look at the problem of generating nar-
rations for autonomous mobile robot navigations. They con-
tribute with verbalization, where the robot experience is de-
scribed via natural language [Rosenthal et al., 2016].
In Model reconciliation [Chakraborti et al., 2017], the fo-
cus is on the agent and the human having two different mod-
els, hence the explanations must identify and reconcile the
relevant differences between the models.
David Smith in his AAAI invited talk presented Planning
as an Iterative Process [Smith, 2012], and he discussed the
broad problem of users interacting with the planning pro-
cess, which also includes questions about choices made by
the planner. Pat Langley et al. more recently used Explain-
able Agency to refer to the ability of autonomous agents to
explain their decisions, and in [Langley et al., 2017] they
discuss some functions that agents should exhibit.
In this paper, we go beyond a discussion of the questions
that need to be answered, and by focusing on AI planning we
provide initial results on how to address some of the questions
and we point to concrete works in the community to address
the others.
3 Things to Be Explained
As mentioned in the introduction, one of the challenges of
XAI is to understand what constitutes an explanation. In gen-
eral, rewriting the steps of the decision-making algorithm in
natural language is not what is required. For example, despite
it being the case that many planners select actions in their
plan-construction process in order to minimize a heuristic dis-
tance to goal, based on a relaxed plan, even these terms are
inappropriate vocabulary to explain the process to a human.
In any case, a real danger in XAI is to reduce an explanation
to the statement of the obvious. It is clearly not the answer to
the question ‘why did you do that?’ to say ’because it got me
closer to the goal’. A request for an explanation is really an
attempt to uncover a piece of knowledge that the questioner
2http://home.earthlink.net/∼dwaha/research/meetings/ijcai17-
xai/
believes must be available to the system and that the ques-
tioner does not have.
In this section we list some of the questions that charac-
terise what it means for the behaviour of a planner to be ex-
plainable, and we discuss what constitutes a response to these
questions.
• Q1: Why did you do that?
This is one of the most fundamental questions that can
be asked about a plan. It is also an excellent example of
how complex the intention behind the question can be.
In a sufficiently long and complex plan, it is plausible
that the questioner is unable to immediately see which
later action in the plan is supported by the target action.
Thus, the answer could be as simple as ‘action A is in the
plan to allow this application of action B’. However, for
shorter and more easily assimilated plans, the question
is far more likely to be an implicit question: ‘why did
you do action A? I would have done action B’
• Q2: And why didn’t you do something else (that I would
have done)?
This question is similar to the intention in Q1, but makes
the alternative action explicit. An answer to this ques-
tion would normally be a demonstration of a flaw in a
plan that uses the proposed alternative action compared
with the plan actually produced. It would usually be ac-
ceptable to demonstrate that the plan actually produced
was no worse than a plan using the proposed alterna-
tive action. In order to respond with either a flaw or else
a demonstration of neutral cost, it is necessary to infer
by what metric the alternatives are to be compared (one
plan might be longer but cheaper than a second — de-
pending on the relative values of time and money, either
plan might be considered better).
• Q3: Why is what you propose to do more effi-
cient/safe/cheap than something else (that I would have
done)?
This question refines Q2 by being explicit about the met-
ric being used to evaluate the plans. If the metric is dif-
ferent to the one used in constructing the original plan,
then the answer might be to point out the different basis
for evaluation of plans. This is a valid explanation pro-
vided the original plan is better under the original metric
than the rival proposal.
• Q4: Why can’t you do that?
Here we consider the form of this question arising when
a planner fails to find a plan for a problem. Planners are
typically not very effective at proving unsolvability of
planning problems, but model-checking techniques can
be applied to planning domain models in order to at-
tempt to prove the non-existence of plans. Unfortunately,
converting the exhaustive search of a space (albeit sup-
plemented with careful relaxation-based approaches that
bundle parts of the search space) into a transparent and
succinct argument is extremely challenging.
• Q5: Why do I need to replan at this point?
During execution, plan failure will be caused by a devi-
ation between the expected behaviour and the observed
behaviour of the world. This question can be directed
at discovering what has diverged from expectation, or it
might be that the deviation is understood, but the signif-
icance of the deviation is not. Thus, this question seeks
to know what is it that the executing plan was depending
on being true that has been observed not to be.
• Q6: Why do I not need to replan at this point?
There are two reasons possible for this question. One is
that the observer has seen a divergence in expected be-
haviour and does not understand why it should not cause
plan failure and the other is that the observer has seen
non-diverging behaviour that is not what was expected
by the observer. In other words, the divergence could be
observable for the executive (and then the explanation is
to show why it does not cause plan failure) or else there
might be no divergence observable by the executive, in
which case the explanation (assuming there is a valid
explanation) is to show why the observed behaviour was
expected at this point.
Of course there are other questions related to Explainable
Planning, including those arising when we consider proba-
bilistic planning or planning under uncertainty, as well as
anytime planning (e.g., will I get a significantly better plan
if I give the planner 10 more minutes?).
4 Unique Features of Planning
AI Planning exploits a collection of techniques that have the
potential to make it easier to understand the decision process
(even if it is very complex and requires sophisticated algo-
rithms and heuristics).
First of all, AI Planning is based on models. Models are
used to create plans, and can also be used during plan exe-
cution as well as after a plan has been executed. One of the
driving principles for a large part of the work carried out in
planning is that planners should encapsulate the machinery
of planning independently of the domain of application. This
means that models capture the dynamics of domains. How-
ever, a second guiding principle has been that domain models
should not attempt to direct the decision process in the plan-
ner (this is not a universally adopted principle, but it has been
a consequence of the international planning competition se-
ries that domain models have been developed to be ‘pure’
descriptions of what can be done, not how to do it). McDer-
mott articulated this as the maxim that domain models should
contain ‘axioms, not advice’. The implication of this for mod-
ellers is that they do not need to understand how a planner
works, but only the behaviour of their domain. This leads to
more intuitive and accessible models for users and facilitates
their use in explanation.
Second, plan execution provides its execution trace, as a set
of pairs (observation, action) which can be used to explore the
reasons behind the choices of actions and allows explanations
to focus on aspects of state or of action choice, depending on
the question.
Third, some progress has been made in explaining plans,
in order to help humans to understand the meaning of plans,
with a long history based on mixed-initiative planning.
Most planners are based on transparent algorithms, where
the planner choice at each decision point is deterministic, re-
peatable and based on a specific choice mechanism. The fact
that the reason for the choice of an action is transparent to the
programmer, at least, makes it plausible that we can construct
an articulation of parts of that reason in a form a human user
might appreciate.
5 Providing Explanations
In this section we address the questions presented in Sec-
tion 3. For each question, we highlight the main challenges,
present some preliminary results and propose a roadmap for
achieving the goal of providing reasonable answers and ex-
planations.
5.1 Explaining why the planner chose an action
This explanation introduces two main challenges, that are
also inherited by all the following explanations. First, an ex-
planation needs to show causality among actions. While this
is obvious in many cases (e.g., I get the key first so that I can
open the door later), there are examples where action A early
in the plan is needed to support action B much later in the
plan. This causal relationship might not be evident.
As a practical example, in the electricity domain [Piacen-
tini et al., 2015], the planner reverses current through a trans-
former early in the afternoon in order to support the achieve-
ment of supply within thermal constraints in the peak demand
period later in the evening. This was performed early because
there was more flexibility to reconfigure the flows when the
load was lighter and by the time the supply was required, de-
mand was so high that the network had no longer got flexibil-
ity to change the configuration.
The second issue is that the plan must be understandable to
humans, who are not supposed to be planning researchers or
experts. Hence, planning formalisms such as PDDL need to
be presented to humans in a more natural-language fashion,
and the works on plan explanation go in this direction (e.g.,
[Seegebarth et al., 2012]).
5.2 Explaining why the planner did not choose an
action
When a planner decision is confronted with an alternative
suggested by the human, an explanation should be a demon-
stration that the alternative action would prevent from finding
a valid plan or would lead to a plan that is no better than the
one found by the planner. However, just showing the different
heuristic value is not a valid explanation, unless it is translated
into a value which is more informative for the user than for
example the RPG heuristic value.
What is needed, instead, is an algorithm that executes the
plan up to the point where the human suggests the alterna-
tive, then injects the human decision, and finally replans from
the state obtained after applying the action suggested by the
human.
Here there is a first issue, though, as one possible behaviour
of the planner could be to just do an undo of the human action
and produce the original plan (see Figure 1 part (a)).
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Figure 1: Possible plan behaviours after human-decision injection.
One possible fix is to forbid the planner to revisit the state
where the human decision was injected. This, however, does
not prevent the planner to get back to the original plan af-
ter k steps, as shown in Figure 1 part (b). In this case, the
explanation can provide the different costs of the two al-
ternatives, that is CA = c(A) + c(α1) + . . . + c(αk) and
CB = c(B) + c(β1) + . . .+ c(βk). More in general, the hu-
man may want to inject a longer plan, and in this sense the
explanation must enable the interaction with the human, by
allowing the human to inject more than one action, and pro-
vide an explanation after each injection.
The two remaining possible outcomes after the human-
decision injections are either that the planner finds a plan for
a different goal, or it fails to find a plan, as shown in Figure 1
parts (c) and (d), respectively.
5.3 Explaining why the planner decisions are better
The third question we listed was: why is the planner decision
more efficient/safe/cheap than what I would do? The focus
here is that different metrics can be used to evaluate a plan.
The more interesting case is when one wants to evaluate a
plan using a metric which is different from the one used when
searching for the plan. This is of practical importance, given
that when dealing with complex domains (temporal/numeric
domains) there are a number of planners able to minimise the
makespan, while almost none are able to optimise other met-
rics (e.g., total cost). Hence, for example one would like to
understand whether a plan found using POPF or FastDown-
ward is actually more efficient (in terms of total cost), than an
alternative plan suggested by the human.
This explanation is a refinement of previous explanations,
and our proposed solution is to integrate the previous expla-
nation approach with the validator VAL [Fox et al., 2005],
where different metrics can be specified to evaluate plans. Af-
ter each injection of human decision, the validator is used to
execute the alternative plan against the new metric (total cost
for example).
5.4 Explaining why things can not be done
There are two reasons why one action can not be applied in
a given state. Either because the current state does not sat-
isfy the action precondition; or because the application of that
action would prevent achieving the goal from the resulting
state. To provide an explanation for the first case is straight-
forward, and the validator VAL already provides this. Expla-
nations for the second case are more challenging, and anyway
would also be used for providing more general justifications
for why the goal cannot be achieved at all (i.e., the planning
problem is unsolvable). To this end, we suggest that a promis-
ing direction is given by the work being done in proving plan
non-existence (see, among others, [Ba¨ckstro¨m et al., 2013],
[Steinmetz and Hoffmann, 2016], [Hoffmann et al., 2014]).
Model-checking algorithms and tools can prove very suit-
able [Clarke et al., 2001]. Indeed, in the planning-as-model-
checking paradigm [Giunchiglia and Traverso, 1999], a plan-
ning problem is cast as a verification problem, where the
safety property to be verified is set as the negation of the goal
of the planning problem. In this way, if the model checker
returns an error trace, that would correspond to the plan. On
the contrary, if the model checker states that the property (not
goal) is satisfied for all the reachable states, this is a proof that
there is no plan. Recently, this paradigm has been applied to
complex planning problems with temporal and numeric fea-
tures [Bogomolov et al., 2014; Bogomolov et al., 2015].
Another very relevant topic is the research around Simple
Temporal Networks [Dechter et al., 1991]. STN can be used,
for example, to show why an action taking longer than ex-
pected can invalidate the plan. There is a large amount of re-
search around STN, STNU [Vidal and Ghallab, 1996], and
controllability of STN. For a survey on this field, we refer to
[Micheli, 2016].
While proving plan-non-existence (or STN inconsistency)
is not yet explaining why the problem is unsolvable, we high-
light here that a roadmap for this question should build on the
cited works.
5.5 Explaining why one needs to replan
This kind of explanation is needed at plan-execution time.
In many real-world scenarios, it is not obvious that the plan
being executed will fail for some changes in the environment
and/or for mismatching about the model of the environment
and the real environment. In most of the cases, plan failure
is discovered only when it is too late for replanning in an
efficient way.
Explanations for when replanning is needed must take into
account the whole plan being executed and check its validity
when monitoring the environment. To this end, one possible
approach is to use the filter violation techniques, as described
in [Cashmore et al., 2015] and implemented in ROSPlan.
ROSPlan uses a Knowledge Base to store information
about the environment and the plan being executed. The
Knowledge Base is updated as soon as new information be-
comes available. Each change to the Knowledge Base is
checked against a filter that is created as follows. Once the
plan is generated, the filter is constructed by taking the inter-
section of static facts in the problem instance with the union
of all preconditions of actions in the plan. In addition, each
object instance involved in these facts is added to the filter.
For example, suppose we have a PDDL domain with the ob-
ject type waypoint, the static fact (connected ?from
?to - waypoint) and the action navigate ( ?v
vehicle ?from ?to waypoint) whose precondi-
tions include (connected ?from ?to). For each
navigate action scheduled in the plan, the waypoint
instances bound to from and to and the ground fact
(connected ?from ?to) are included in the filter. If
these objects are removed, or altered in the Knowledge Base,
a notification will be sent to the Planning System. An exam-
ple of this type of explanation is provided in Section 6.
Another promising approach in this direction is Discover-
History, described in [Molineaux et al., 2012].
5.6 Explaining why one does not have to replan
This explanation is of practical importance, as it is concerned
with the situation where the environment being observed (in-
cluding the plan execution) is different from what was antic-
ipated. In this very common case, it is important to avoid the
naive approach of continuous replanning. Rather, it would be
ideal to have a way to understand why the plan is still valid,
despite the differences between what expected and what be-
ing observed. The most common scenario is when actions are
taking longer than expected (again, one can think of an under-
water mission, where an unexpected current is slowing down
the AUV, hence navigate actions are taking longer than antic-
ipated). We highlight here that a promising research direction
is represented by the work on dynamic controllability of STN
(e.g., [Vidal and Fargier, 1999], [Morris et al., 2001]).
6 Illustrative Examples
In this section we provide two examples of how the approach
described in the previous section can be used to explain a plan
and to explain why replanning is needed.
6.1 The Rover Domain
We consider the rover time domain from IPC-4 and prob-
lem 3. Here is the plan found by POP-F [Coles et al., 2010].
0.000: (navigate r1 wp3 wp0) [5.0]
0.000: (navigate r0 wp1 wp0) [5.0]
5.001: (calibrate r1 camera1 obj0 wp0) [5.0]
5.001: (sample_rock r0 r0store wp0) [8.0]
10.002: (take_image r1 wp0 obj0 camera1 col) [7.0]
13.001: (navigate r0 wp0 wp1) [5.0]
17.002: (navigate r1 wp0 wp3) [5.0]
18.001: (comm_rock_data r0 general wp0 wp1 wp0) [10.0]
22.003: (navigate r1 wp3 wp2) [5.0]
27.003: (sample_soil r1 r1store wp2) [10.0]
28.002: (comm_image_data r1 general obj0 col wp2 wp0) [15.0]
43.003: (comm_soil_data r1 general wp2 wp2 wp0) [10.0]
[Duration = 53.003]
An instance of Q1 could be: ”Why did you use Rover0 to take
the rock sample at waypoint0?”
A naive answer could be: so that I can
communicate rock data from Rover0 later in the
plan (at 18.001). This is naive because the plan is so short
that the user can easily see that this is performed and, pre-
sumably, will realise that the data can only be communicated
by the rover that has it. A better way to interpret the question
would be to consider alternative ways to achieve the goal
this action supports: to communicate the rock data from
Waypoint0. It turns out the only way to communicate the
rock data is to first have the rock analysis from Waypoint0.
And there are only two ways to do this, either to sample rock
with Rover0 and or with Rover1.
Hence, an instance of Q2 could be: Why didn’t Rover1 take
the rock sample at waypoint0? In order to provide an answer
to this question, we need to force the planner to second the
human input. To this end, we remove the ground action in-
stance for Rover0 from those available to the planner and ask
it to replan, and here is the new plan:
0.000: (navigate r1 wp3 wp0) [5.0]
5.001: (calibrate r1 camera1 obj0 wp0) [5.0]
10.002: (take_image r1 wp0 obj0 camera1 col) [7.0]
10.003: (sample_rock r1 r1store wp0) [8.0]
18.003: (navigate r1 wp0 wp3) [5.0]
18.004: (drop r1 r1store) [1.0]
23.004: (navigate r1 wp3 wp2) [5.0]
28.004: (comm_image_data r1 general obj0 col wp2 wp0) [15.0]
28.005: (sample_soil r1 r1store wp2) [10.0]
43.005: (comm_soil_data r1 general wp2 wp2 wp0) [10.0]
53.006: (comm_rock_data r1 general wp0 wp2 wp0) [10.0]
[Duration = 63.006]
Clearly this is far worse quality than the first plan (the met-
ric is specified as makespan for these plans). So the answer
could be: Because not using Rover0 for this action leads to
a worse plan. It could be argued that this is not a very sat-
isfactory answer, although it is better than the naive answer
above, because it does not seem to explain why Rover1 does
everything.
One option is for the human to follow up with another
question: Why does Rover1 do everything? In order to answer
this question, we can require the plan to contain at least one
action that has Rover0 as an argument. This could be encoded
in the domain automatically, by adding a dummy effect to all
actions using Rover0 and then adding this as a goal, but here
we use a plan generated by remodelling the domain manually,
and this is the new plan found by the planner:
0.000: (navigate r0 wp1 wp0) [5.0]
0.000: (navigate r1 wp3 wp0) [5.0]
5.001: (calibrate r1 camera1 obj0 wp0) [5.0]
10.002: (take_image r1 wp0 obj0 camera1 col) [7.0]
10.003: (sample_rock r1 r1store wp0) [8.0]
18.003: (navigate r1 wp0 wp3) [5.0]
18.004: (drop r1 r1store) [1.0]
23.004: (navigate r1 wp3 wp2) [5.0]
28.004: (comm_image_data r1 general obj0 col wp2 wp0) [15.0]
28.005: (sample_soil r1 r1store wp2) [10.0]
43.005: (comm_soil_data r1 general wp2 wp2 wp0) [10.0]
53.006: (comm_rock_data r1 general wp0 wp2 wp0) [10.0]
Hence, an explanation is that this plan, while not being any
longer, contains more actions, so is even worse than the last
plan (and in fact contains all the actions of the last plan, so is
actually a simple extension of that plan).
However, this is also not entirely satisfactory, because it
only shows us that the planner cannot find a useful way to in-
corporate Rover0 into the plan, but not why. If we restrict the
actions that can be used to achieve the dummy condition (that
Rover0 acted in the plan) to the set of actions that achieve
goals, then the planner cannot find a plan. So, the answer to
the question could be slightly improved to: I cannot find a
plan in which Rover0 does not sample the rock at Waypoint0,
but achieves a goal in the plan.
In fact, it turns out that the problem specification prevents
Rover0 from reaching Waypoint2, so the soil data there can-
not be collected by Rover0, while only Camera1 can be cal-
ibrated for Objective0, so only Rover1 that carries Camera1
can be used to take that image. Therefore, the only task that
Rover0 can perform is the rock sample mission at Waypoint0.
6.2 The AUV Domain
We consider the AUV domain from the PANDORA
project [Cashmore et al., 2014; Palomeras et al., 2016], where
an AUV has to complete an inspection mission, by navigating
(do hover) between waypoints and making observation of
a set of inspection points. Here is a fragment of a plan for this
scenario:
0.000: (observe auv wp1 ip3) [10.000]
10.001: (correct_position auv wp1) [10.000]
20.002: (do_hover auv wp1 wp2) [71.696]
91.699: (observe auv wp2 ip4) [10.000]
101.700: (correct_position auv wp2) [10.000]
111.701: (do_hover auv wp2 wp23) [16.710]
128.412: (observe auv wp23 ip5) [10.000]
138.413: (correct_position auv wp23) [10.000]
148.414: (observe auv wp23 ip1) [10.000]
158.415: (correct_position auv wp23) [10.000]
168.416: (do_hover auv wp23 wp22) [16.710]
185.127: (do_hover auv wp22 wp26) [30.201]
215.329: (observe auv wp26 ip7) [10.000]
225.330: (correct_position auv wp26) [10.000]
235.331: (do_hover auv wp26 wp21) [23.177]
258.509: (observe auv wp21 ip2) [10.000]
268.510: (correct_position auv wp21) [10.000]
278.511: (do_hover auv wp21 wp27) [21.255]
299.767: (observe auv wp27 ip8) [10.000]
309.768: (correct_position auv wp27) [10.000]
319.769: (observe auv wp27 ip6) [10.000]
329.770: (correct_position auv wp27) [10.000]
339.771: (do_hover auv wp27 wp17) [23.597]
363.369: (do_hover auv wp17 wp25) [21.413]
384.783: (do_hover auv wp25 wp32) [16.710]
401.494: (do_hover auv wp32 wp36) [21.451]
422.946: (observe auv wp36 ip9) [10.000]
432.947: (correct_position auv wp36) [10.000]
442.948: (observe auv wp36 ip15) [10.000]
In the PANDORA project, the plans are generated and dis-
patched through the ROSPlan framework [Cashmore et al.,
2015] which is also used to monitor plan execution. ROSPlan
implements the filter violation described in Section 5.5.
Figure 2 shows the execution of the plan above.
The blue lines represent the Probabilistic Road Map used
to determine accessibility for the AUV, while the yellow lines
represent the AUV trajectory. At time-point 215.329, while
the AUV is observing the inspection point ip7 it also ob-
serves that waypoints wp32 and wp36 are actually not con-
Figure 2: Plan Execution in the AUV Domain.
nected (this is represented by the red line in Figure 5.5). Given
that (connected wp32 wp36) was in the filter and af-
ter this observation the predicate is removed, a filter violation
is triggered, which provides a justification for why replanning
is needed, explaining that an action later in the plan (precisely
at time-point 401.494) will no longer be executable, and also
highlighting which condition has changed from its expected
value to one that prevents the plan from being executable.
7 Conclusion
We have introduced Explainable Planning (XAIP), as a
promising contribution to the Explainable AI (XAI) chal-
lenge. We characterised some of the questions that need to
be explained, and provided initial results and a roadmap for
achieving the objective of providing effective explanations.
The next steps include a full formalisation of the XAIP prob-
lem, and a formulation of the user/planner interaction in terms
of new constraints to add and alternatives to explore.
This work opens up a number of future directions in expla-
nations for plans as well as plan execution. For example tem-
poral planning introduces interesting planning choices about
the order in which (sub)goals are achieved. Another interest-
ing problem is to understand whether to expect improvement
in giving the planner a given additional amount time for plan-
ning. For plan execution, especially with probabilistic plan-
ning and planning under uncertainty, one of the problems is
to explain what has been observed at execution time that made
the planner make a particular choice.
There is no clear way to define what constitutes a good ex-
planation. As we argued in the paper, XAIP should not focus
on explaining the obvious. However, defining a good metric
for explanation is an important issue.
More in general, the literature in planning contains many
works that could contribute to Explainable Planning. On the
other hand, nowadays plans are much more complex than be-
fore, and are also used in many new critical domains. Exist-
ing works should be revisited and leveraged in order to make
XAIP more effective and efficient.
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